Foreign Capital, National Welfare and Unemployment in a Fair Wage Model by Chaudhuri, Sarbajit & Banerjee, Dibyendu
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Foreign Capital, National Welfare and
Unemployment in a Fair Wage Model
Sarbajit Chaudhuri and Dibyendu Banerjee
University of Calcutta
30 August 2009
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18005/
MPRA Paper No. 18005, posted 22 October 2009 09:53 UTC
1 
 
Foreign Capital, National Welfare and Unemployment in a Fair Wage Model  
 
Sarbajit Chaudhuri 
Dept. of Economics, University of Calcutta, India. 
E-mail: sarbajitch@yahoo.com  
and 
Dibyendu Banerjee 
Dept. of Economics, Serampore College, Dt. Hooghly, West Bengal, India.  
E-mail: dib_banerjee123@yahoo.com 
 
Address for communication: Dr. Sarbajit Chaudhuri, 23 Dr. P.N. Guha Road, 
Belgharia, Kolkata 700083, India. Tel: 91-33-2557-5082 (O); Fax: 91-33-2844-1490 (P) 
(This version: August 2009) 
 
Abstract: The paper develops a three-sector general equilibrium model that can explain 
simultaneous existence of unemployment of both skilled and unskilled labour. The 
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Foreign Capital, National Welfare and Unemployment in a Fair Wage Model  
 
1. Introduction 
 
There exists a voluminous theoretical literature that examines the welfare consequence of 
foreign capital inflows in a small open economy both in the absence and presence of 
unemployment. Brecher and Alejandro (1977) have considered a two-commodity, two-
factor full employment model while Khan (1982) has used a mobile capital Harris-
Todaro (hereafter HT) model with urban unemployment for the analytical purpose. The 
important result, common to both which is well-known as the Brecher-Alejandro 
proposition, is as follows. The inflow of foreign capital with full repatriation of its 
earnings is necessarily immiserizing if the import-competing sector is capital-intensive 
and is protected by a tariff. However, social welfare does not change in the absence of 
any tariff. Here welfare is defined as a positive function of national income.  
 
In the literature, the Brecher-Alejandro proposition has also been re-examined in terms of 
three-sector models. The third sector may either be a duty-free zone (DFZ) (sometimes 
called foreign enclave) as in the works of Beladi and Marjit (1992a, 1992b) or it may be 
an urban informal sector as in the works of Grinols (1991) and Chandra and Khan (1993). 
Beladi and Marjit (1992a) have shown that with full-repatriation of foreign capital 
income, an inflow of foreign capital may lead to immiserizing growth in the presence of 
tariff-distortion even if the foreign capital is employed in the export sector. This 
generalizes the main result in the existing literature, which primarily focuses on foreign 
capital inflow in the protected sector of the economy.  
 
However, there are works like Marjit and Beladi (1996), Chaudhuri (2005, 2007) and 
Chaudhuri et al. (2006) which have demonstrated how foreign capital might produce 
favourable effect on welfare taking into consideration some essential features of the 
developing economies e.g. labour market distortion, presence of vast informal economy 
and non-traded goods. Chaudhuri (2007) and Chaudhuri et al. (2006) have adopted three-
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sector HT framework that explains urban unemployment as a migration-equilibrium 
phenomenon.  
  
How to explain unemployment as a general equilibrium phenomenon depends on which 
type of labour we are considering, skilled or unskilled. The Harris-Todaro (1970) type of 
model is one way to explain unemployment in a general equilibrium setup where the 
efficiency of each worker is considered to be exogenously given and equal to unity. 
However, in such a model unemployment is specific to the urban sector and is suitable to 
explain unemployment of unskilled labour only.1 But it does not account for the 
unemployment of skilled labour which is a disquieting problem in a developing economy 
particularly after global economic slowdown. 
 
It is important to note that in an economy the possibility of being unemployed also rises 
with increasing education and skills. In the case of India, NSSO surveys conducted over 
the years show that the unemployment rate among those educated above the secondary 
level was higher, in both rural and urban areas, than those with lesser educational 
attainments. The NSSO 61st Round report, Employment and Unemployment Situation in 
India 2004-05, attributes this to the fact that “the job seekers become gradually more and 
more choosers as their educational level increases.” Serneels (2007) also has found that in 
Ethiopia unemployment is concentrated among the relatively well-educated first time job 
seekers who come from the middle classes.      
 
For explaining the existence of unemployment of skilled labour one has to recourse to the 
efficiency wage theories. A generalized version of efficiency wage theory is the ‘fair 
wage hypothesis’ (FWH). Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995), Feher (1991), Akerlof and 
                                                           
1 The involuntary unemployment of unskilled labour can also be explained by using the 
‘consumption efficiency hypothesis’ (CEH) of Leibenstein (1957), Bliss and Stern (1978), 
Dasgupta and Ray (1986) etc. where the nutritional efficiency of a worker depends positively on 
his consumption level. The CEH is the earliest version of the efficiency wage theory and is 
applicable to the poor unskilled workers who are at or slightly above their subsistence 
consumption level.  
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Yellen (1990), etc. have explained unemployment as a general equilibrium phenomenon 
using the FWH. As per the Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995) treatment of the FWH, the 
efficiency of a worker is sensitive to the functional distribution of income. Consequently, 
the return to capital, wage rates and the unemployment rates of different types of labour 
appear as arguments in the efficiency function.   
 
The objectives of the present paper are as follows. First, as the developing economies are 
plagued by both skilled and unskilled unemployment it is extremely important to develop 
an analytical framework that can be useful in analyzing the consequences of different 
policies on the national welfare and unemployment of both types of labour. We develop a 
three-sector specific-factor Harris-Todaro type general equilibrium model where the 
FWH is valid. Secondly, we intend to examine the validity of the standard immiserizing 
result of foreign capital inflows using this setup. Finally, the consequences of capital 
inflows on the unemployment of both types labour have been studied. The paper finds 
that although an inflow of foreign capital into the primary export sector unambiguously 
improves social welfare foreign capital inflows into the other two sectors may be welfare-
worsening. Unemployment situation of skilled labour unequivocally improves in both 
cases. Finally, while capital of type N definitely lowers the urban unemployment of 
unskilled labour, an inflow of the other type of capital may fail to improve the situation 
unless the centripetal force of an increase in the rural sector wage is stronger than the 
centrifugal force resulting from an increase in the expected urban wage. Therefore the 
paper justifies the desirability of FDI flow in the primary export sector from the 
perspective of both unemployment and social welfare.   
 
 
2.  The Model 
 
We consider a small open dual economy with three sectors: one rural and two urban. 
There are two types of capital, capital of type N and capital of type K, and two types of 
labour, skilled and unskilled. The rural sector produces an agricultural commodity using 
both types of capital and unskilled labour. Capital of type N is interpreted as a composite 
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input2 that is broadly defined to include not only natural resource like land but also 
durable capital equipments e.g. tractors, harvesters, weed cutters, pump sets for irrigation 
purpose. FDI in N implies an increased supply of the durable agricultural capital 
implements. On the other hand, capital of type K is used to purchase inputs like 
fertilizers, pesticides, weedicides etc.  The capital (of type K)-output ratio in sector 1, 
1,Ka  is assumed to be technologically given.
3
  Sector 2 is an urban sector that produces a 
low-skill manufacturing good by means of capital of type K and unskilled labour. Finally, 
sector 3, another urban sector, uses capital of type K and skilled labour to produce a high -
skill commodity. As sectors 2 and 3 produce non-agricultural commodities capital of type 
N is specific to the rural sector (sector 1). Skilled labour is a specific input in sector 3. 
Unskilled labour is imperfectly mobile between sectors 1 and 2 while capital of type K is 
completely mobile among all the three sectors of the economy. Sector 2 faces an 
imperfect unskilled labour market in the form of a unionized labour market where 
unskilled workers receive a contractual wage, *W , while the unskilled wage rate in the 
rural sector, ,W is market determined. The two unskilled wage rates are related by the 
Harris-Todaro (1970) migration equilibrium condition where the expected urban wage 
equals the rural wage rate and .* WW   Hence, there is urban unemployment of unskilled 
labour. On the other hand, we use the FWH to explain unemployment of skilled labour 
and the efficiency function is similar to that in Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995).  This 
function can be derived from the effort norm of the skilled workers which is sensitive to 
the functional distribution of income and the skilled unemployment rate. This is the 
optimal effort function of the utility maximizing skilled workers. Capital of either type 
                                                           
2 This composite input is called ‘land-capital’ in the works of Bardhan (1973), Chaudhuri (2007) 
and Chaudhuri and Yabuuchi (2008).  
 
3 Although this is a simplifying assumption it is not completely without any basis. Agriculture 
requires inputs like fertilizers, pesticides, weedicides etc. which are to be used in recommended 
doses. Now if capital of type K is used to purchase those inputs, the capital (K type)-output ratio, 
1,Ka becomes constant technologically. However, labour and capital of type N are substitutes and 
the production function displays the property of constant returns to scale in these two inputs. 
However, even if the capital(K type)-output ratio is not given technologically the results of the 
paper still hold under an additional sufficient condition incorporating the partial elasticities of 
substitution between capital of type K and other inputs in sector 1.  
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includes both domestic capital and foreign capital. Incomes from foreign capital are 
completely repatriated. Sectors 1 and 3 are the two export sectors while sector 2 is the 
import-competing sector and is protected by an import tariff.  Sector 2 uses capital of 
type K more intensively with respect to unskilled labour vis-à-vis sector 1. Production 
functions exhibit constant returns to scale4 with positive and diminishing marginal 
productivity to each factor.  Commodity 3 is chosen as the numeraire. 
 
The following symbols will be used for formal presentation of the model. 
 
Kia   amount of capital of type K required to produce 1 unit of output in the ith sector, 
i   1,2,3; 
Nia = amount of capital of type N required to produce 1 unit of output in sector 1;  
Lia unskilled labour-output ratio in the ith sector, i   1,2; 
3Sa  skilled labour-output ratio in sector 3 (in efficiency unit); 
iP exogenously given relative price of the i th commodity, i  = 1,2; 
t  ad-valorem rate of tariff on the import of commodity 2;  
iX level of output of the i th sector, i   1,2,3; 
E  efficiency of each skilled worker; 
SW wage rate of skilled labour; 
SW
E
 wage rate per efficiency unit of skilled labour; 
*W  unionized unskilled wage in sector 2; 
W competitive wage rate of unskilled labour in sector 1; 
r  return to capital of type K (both domestic and foreign); 
R   return to capital of type N (both domestic and foreign)  
L  endowment of unskilled labour (in physical unit);  
S  endowment of skilled labour (in physical unit); 
v  unemployment rate of skilled labour; 
                                                           
4 See footnote 3 in this context. 
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UL = urban unemployment of unskilled labour; 
K  economy’s aggregate capital stock of K type (domestic plus foreign);  
N   economy’s aggregate capital stock of N type (domestic plus foreign);  
ji distributive share of the j th input in the i th sector for j ,N , ,L S K  and i  1, 2, 
3; 
ji proportion of the j th input employed in the i th sector for j KL, and i 1,2,3; 
'' proportionate change. 
 
Given the perfectly competitive commodity markets the three price-unit cost equality 
conditions relating to the three industries are as follows.  
 
1 1 1 1L K NWa ra Ra P             (1) 
*
2 2 2 (1 )L KW a ra P t                  (2) 
3 3 1S S K
W a ra
E
                    (3) 
 
Following Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995) we assume that the effort norms of the 
skilled labour depend positively on (i) skilled wage relative to average unskilled wage; 
(ii) skilled wage relative to returns on capital of both types; and, positively on (iii) the 
unemployment rate of skilled labour. It may be mentioned that the average unskilled 
wage in the economy is the rural sector wage that follows from the ‘envelope property’ of 
the HT framework.5 Therefore, we write                                                               
 
( , , , )S S SW W WE E v
W r R
            (4)           
The efficiency function satisfies the following mathematical restrictions:  
                                                           
5 Unskilled workers are employed in the rural and low-skill urban manufacturing sectors where 
they earn W and *W wages, respectively. Some of the unskilled workers remain unemployed in 
the urban sector earning nothing. The average wage income of all unskilled workers in the 
economy is the rural sector wage. This can be easily shown from equations (10) and (11). So, the 
efficiency function, given by equation (4), indirectly takes into account the unioni zed wage and 
the urban unemployment of unskilled labour as determinants.  
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1 2 3 4, , , 0E E E E  ; 11 22 33, , 0E E E  ; 12 13 14 23 24 34 0E E E E E E      .⁭
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The unit cost of skilled labour in sector 3, denoted  , is given by 
( )
(.)
SW
E
            (5) 
 
Each firm in sector 3 minimizes its unit cost of skilled labour as given by (5). The first-
order condition of minimization is 
1 2 3
S S SW W WE E E E
W r R
           (6) 
where: iE s are the partial derivatives of the efficiency function with respect to 
( )SW
W
, ( )SW
r
and ( )SW
R
, respectively. Equation (6) can be rewritten as 
1 2 3 1              (6.1) 
where i is the elasticity of the (.)E function with respect to its i th argument. This is the 
modified Solow condition as obtained in Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995). 
  
Full utilization of N and K types of capital respectively entail 
1 1Na X N             (7)   
1 1 2 2 3 3K K Ka X a X a X K             (8) 
 
There is unemployment of skilled labour in the economy and the rate of unemployment is 
.v  The skilled labour endowment equation is, therefore, given by 
3 3 (1 )Sa X E v S             (9) 
In the migration equilibrium there exists urban unemployment of unskilled labour. The 
unskilled labour endowment equation is given by 
1 1 2 2L L Ua X a X L L                               (10) 
                                                           
6 Mathematical derivation of the efficiency function from the rational behavior of a representative 
skilled worker and explanations of the mathematical restrictions on the partial derivatives are 
available in Agell and Lundborg (1992, 1995). 
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In a Harris-Todaro framework the unskilled labour allocation mechanism is such that in 
the labor market equilibrium, the rural wage rate, ,W equals the expected wage income in 
the urban sector. Since the probability of finding a job in the urban low-skill sector is 
2 2 2 2( / ( ))L L Ua X a X L the expected unskilled wage in the urban sector is 
2 2 2 2( * / ( ))L L UW a X a X L . Therefore, the rural-urban migration equilibrium condition of 
unskilled labour is expressed as 
2 2 2 2( * / ( ))L L UW a X a X L W  , 
or equivalently, 
2 2 1 1( * / ) L LW W a X a X L                                                                              (11) 
 
Using (7) and (9) equations (11) and (8) can be rewritten as follows.  
*
1
2 2
1
( ) LL
N
aW a X N L
W a
  ; and,                                                     (11.1) 
31
2 2
1 3
(1 )[( ) { }]KK K
N S
a E v Sa N a X K
a a
         (8.1) 
In this general equilibrium model there are ten endogenous variables; namely, , , ,W r R  
1 2, , , , ,S UW E v L X X and 3X and the same number of independent equations; namely, (1) – 
(4), (6), (7), (8.1), (9), (10) and (11.1). The endogenous variables are determined as 
follows. The system does not possess the decomposition property. r is found from (2) 
as *W is given exogenously. , , ,SW R W v and 2X are simultaneously solved from equations 
(1), (4), (6), (8.1) and (11.1). E is then found from (3). 1X and 3X are solved from 
equations (7) and (9), respectively. Finally, UL is found from (10).  
 
A close look at the price system reveals that given the value of R , sectors 1 and 2 can be 
conceived to form a Heckscher-Ohlin subsystem (HOSS) as they use two common 
inputs: unskilled labour and capital of type K. It is sensible to assume that sector 2 is 
more capital-intensive than sector 1 in value sense with respect to unskilled labour. This 
implies that 2 2 1 1( / * ) ( / )K L K La W a a Wa . 
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We measure welfare of the economy by national income at world prices, Y , and is given 
by 
2 2(1 )D D SY WL RN rK W v S tP X                                                                 (12) 
It is assumed that the foreign capital incomes of both types are fully repatriated. In 
equation (12), WL  and (1 )SW v S give the aggregate wage incomes of the unskilled and 
skilled workers, respectively. DRN and DrK denote rental incomes from domestic capital 
of types N and K . Finally, 22 XtP measures the cost of tariff protection
 of the import-
competing sector. 
 
3. Comparative Statics 
 
We are now going to analyze the consequences of inflows of foreign capital on national 
welfare and unemployment of both skilled and unskilled labour. An inflow of foreign 
capital into the primary export sector is captured by an increase in the endowment of N 
type of capital. On the other hand, the endowment of K type of capital goes up when 
foreign capital flows into the other two sectors including the tariff-protected import-
competing sector. The incomes on foreign capital are completely repatriated.  
 
Differentiating equations (1), (4) (6), (11.1) and (8.1) the following expressions  are 
derived, respectively.7 
1 1
ˆ ˆ 0L NW R                                 (13) 
1 3 4
ˆ ˆ ˆ 0W R v                           (14) 
1 2 3 4
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0SBW B R B W v                 (15) 
*
5 6 2 2 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
L LB W B R X N              (16) 
1 1
1 1 2 2 3 4 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ( ) ( )K NL K NL K K S KS W S R X W B v K N              (17) 
where:  
 
                                                           
7 Note that 1Ka is technologically given. See footnote 2 in this context.  
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211
1 ( ) 0S
WEB
E W
   ; 2332 ( ) 0S
E WB
E R
  ;  
 2 2 2 3311 223 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0S S S
W W W EE EB
W E r E R E
      
; 34 ( ) 01
K vB
v
 

;        (18) 
 * 1 15 2 1[ ( )] 0L L LN NLB S S     ; 1 16 1[ ( )] 0L LN NLB S S   ; and, 
 *2 2
*( ) 0.L L
W
W
  
 
Here  kjiS  is the degree of substitution between factors in sector k . For example, 
1 1
1
( )( )LLL
L
aWS
a W


, 1 1
1
( )( )LLN
L
aRS
a R


etc. 0kjiS  for  j k ; & 0
k
jjS  . 
  
Arranging (13) – (17) in a matrix notation one obtains 
1 1
1 3 4
1 2 3 4
*
5 6 2 1
1 1
1 1 3 4 2 12
ˆ 00 0 0
ˆ 00 0
0ˆ0
ˆ0 0 ˆ
ˆ ˆˆ
L N
S
L L
K NL K NL K K K
W
R
B B B W
B B Nv
S S B K NX
 
  

 
    
                                          
    (19) 
The determinant to the coefficient matrix is 
* 1 * 1
4 3 1 2 6 1 2 1 2 5 1 2( ) ( )L K K L NL N K K L NLD B B S B S                
                                    (+)                                    (+)  
                                                          *2 4 3 3 4   + [ ]L K J B B H       (20) 
                                                                                    (–)(+) 
 where  
1 2 3 1 1 1{ ( ) ( )}L NJ B B       ; 
1 3 1 1( )L NH      .                             (21) 
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As the production structure is indecomposable an increase in capital stock of type N must 
decrease its rate of return, R i.e. ˆ ˆ( / ) 0R N  . Thus, solving (19) by Cramer’s rule it can be 
easily proved8 that  
0D            (22) 
 
For determining the signs of J and H we need to impose some restrictions on the relative 
responsiveness of the (.)E , 1E and 3E functions with respect to their two arguments: 
( )SW
W
and ( )SW
R
. The efficiency function, given by equation (4), is assumed to satisfy the 
following two special properties. 
Property A The responsiveness of (.)E with respect to SW
R
is greater than that with 
respect to SW
W
 such that 3 1
1 1
( ) ( )
N L
 
 
 . 
Property B The algebraic value of the elasticity of 3E  with respect to S
W
R
is not less 
than that of 1E  with respect to S
W
W
i.e. 33 11
3 1
( ) ( ).S SE W E W
E R E W
  
 
The implications of the above two properties are as follows. Although the efficiency of 
the skilled workers depends on the relative income distribution, they are expected to have 
different attitudes towards the earnings of different factors of production. So changes in 
incomes of different factors should affect the efficiency of skilled labour in different 
degrees. It is reasonable to assume that the average unskilled wage is substantially lower 
than the skilled wage. That is why the skilled workers are expected to have a soft feeling 
towards their unskilled counterparts. On the contrary, they would feel to be deprived 
significantly if the returns on both types of capital increase relative to the skilled wage 
                                                           
8 This has been shown in Appendix I.  
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which badly affect their work morale. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that increases 
in incomes of the capitalists cause a greater negative response among the skilled workers 
and lower their efficiency than that resulting from an increase in the average unskilled 
wage.  
 
Properties (A) and (B) of the efficiency function together imply that 9 
1 1 1 1
1 3 3 2
( ) ( ) ( );  and,L
N
B
B
  
  
 
                                               (23) 
1 2 3 1 1 1 1 3 1 1{ ( ) ( )} 0; ( ) 0L N L NJ B B H              
   
 
Differentiating (2) and (3) it is easy to show that 
ˆ ˆ
SE W           (24) 
This leads to the following corollary. 
Corollary 1: The efficiency of skilled labour, E , and the skilled wage rate, SW , always 
change in the same direction and in the same proportion. 
 
From (13) we can write 
1
1
ˆ ˆ( )N
L
W R

            (25) 
This establishes the following corollary. 
Corollary 2: W and R are negatively correlated. 
 
Using (25) equation (14) can be rewritten as follows. 
3 1 1 1
4 1
ˆ( )ˆ L N
L
Rv    
 
          (26) 
Using (23) from (26) the following corollary is imminent. 
Corollary 3: R and v are positively related.10 
                                                           
9 This has been proved in Appendix II.  
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Adding (14) and (15) and substituting for Wˆ from (13) we get 
1 3 2 1 1 1
1 3
( ) ( )ˆ ˆ[ ]L NS
L
B BW R
B
   

          (27) 
                              (–) 
With the help of (23) from (27) the following corollary immediately follows. 
Corollary 4: R and SW are negatively related. 
 
Solving (19) by Cramer’s rule the following proposition can be easily established. 11 
Proposition 1: Under assumptions A and B, an inflow of either type of capital leads to (i) 
an increase in the rural unskilled wage (W ); (ii) a decrease in the return to capital of type 
N; (iii) an increase in the skilled wage ( SW );.(iv) a fall in the unemployment rate of 
skilled labour ( v ); and, (v) an expansion of sector 3. Furthermore, (vi) sector 1 expands 
(contracts) while sector 2 contracts (expands) owing to inflows of capital of type N (type 
K). 
 
An inflow of foreign capital of type N into sector 1 lowers its return, R . This raises the 
value of marginal product of unskilled labour and hence the rural unskilled wage, W . 
This becomes clear if one looks at equation (1). A fall in R lowers the skilled 
unemployment rate, v (corollary 3) and raises the skilled wage, SW (corollary 4) and hence 
their efficiency, E (corollary 1). As employment of skilled labour rises in efficiency unit 
(also in physical unit) sector 3 expands and draws capital from the other two sectors. 
Consequently, the capital-intensive sector 2 contracts and the unskilled labour-intensive 
sector 1 expands following a Rybczynski type effect.  
 
On the other hand, an inflow of foreign capital of type K cannot change its return, r , as it 
is determined from equation (2). It produces a Rybczynski effect in the HOSS. Sector 2 
                                                                                                                                                                             
10 As the rural sector unskilled wage and the return on capital of type N are negatively related 
(corollary 2) there is a negative relationship between the average unskilled (rural) wage and 
skilled unemployment rate. 
 
11 See Appendix III for mathematical derivations of the results. 
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expands while sector 1 contracts as the former is more capital -intensive than the latter. As 
sector 1 contracts the demand for capital of type N falls. This lowers R which in turn 
raises bothW (corollary 2) and SW (corollary 4) and hence E (corollary 1) and lowers the 
skilled unemployment rate, v (corollary 3). As the employment of skilled labour rises both 
in efficiency and physical units sector 3 expands. 
 
Differentiating the national income expression (equation 12) the following proposition 
can be proved.12 
Proposition 2: An inflow of foreign capital of type N is unambiguously welfare-
improving13 while inflows of K type of capital may fail to boost up social welfare.   
 
We can explain proposition 2 in the following fashion. In proposition 1 we find that an 
inflow of foreign capital of either type raises the aggregate unskilled wage, aggregate 
skilled employment and hence the aggregate skilled wage but lowers the domestic capital 
income of N type. The domestic capital income of K type, however, remains unchanged. 
It is easy to show that the increase in the aggregate unskilled wage income dominates 
over the fall in the capital income of N type. Hence in either case the aggregate factor 
income unambiguously rises. Besides, an inflow of capital of N type leads to a 
contraction of the tariff protected import-competing sector. Hence the cost of protection 
of the import-competing sector falls. Social welfare unequivocally improves in this case. 
But in the case of K type capital the protected sector expands. Hence there is no 
guarantee that it improves social welfare unless the positive aggregate factor income 
effect is strong enough to dominate over the negative distortionary effect of tariff 
protection of the import-competing sector.  
 
                                                           
12 This has been proved in Appendix IV. 
 
13 An inflow of foreign capital of type N raises the economy’s aggregate stock of durable 
agricultural capital implements. Here foreign capital inflow takes place into the economy’s 
primary export sector. There are other papers in the literature like Beladi and Marjit (1992a, 
1992b) that have examined the welfare consequence of foreign capital into a  small open 
economy’s export sector. However, they have found the inflow of foreign capital to be 
immiserizing.  
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Subtraction of equation (10) from (11) yields  
2 2
*( )U L
W WL a X
W
          (28) 
 
Totally differentiating equation (28) one can establish the final proposition of the 
model.14 
Proposition 3: An inflow of foreign capital of type N unambiguously improves the urban 
unemployment problem of unskilled labour. On the contrary, inflows of type K capital 
improve the unemployment situation of unskilled labour 
if 1 11 1 1
1 2
)1 (( )( )).L N L LN NL
N L
S S  
 
   
 
We explain proposition 3 in the following manner. In the migration equilibrium the 
expected urban wage for a prospective unskilled rural migrant equals the actual unskilled 
rural wage. An inflow of foreign capital of either type affects the migration equilibrium 
in two ways. First, the low-skill urban manufacturing sector expands or contracts. This 
leads to a change in the number of jobs available in this sector. The expected urban wage 
for a prospective rural migrant, 2 2[ * /{1 ( / )}],U LW L a X changes as the probability of 
getting a job in this sector changes for every unskilled worker. This is the centrifugal 
force. If the expected urban wage rises (falls) the centrifugal force is positive 
(negative).This paves the way for fresh migration (reverse migration) from the rural 
(urban) to the urban (rural) sector. On the other hand, an inflow of foreign capital of 
either type raises the rural unskilled wage (see proposition 1). This is the centripetal force 
that prevents rural workers from migrating into the urban sector. Thus, there are clearly 
two opposite effects working on determination of the size of the unemployed urban 
unskilled workforce. In the case of an inflow of foreign capital of type N the low-skill 
urban manufacturing sector contracts both in terms of output and employment. The 
expected urban unskilled wage falls. So the centrifugal force is negative and drives the 
unemployed urban workers to return to the rural sector. Thus, both the centripetal and the 
centrifugal forces work in the same direction and cause the urban unemployment of 
                                                           
14 See Appendix V for mathematical proof of this proposition.  
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unskilled labour to decline. On the contrary, in the case of an inflow of foreign capital of 
K type the low-skill urban sector expands and causes the expected urban unskilled wage 
to rise. This leads to more migration from the rural sector to the urban sector. Therefore, 
in this case the centrifugal and centripetal forces work in the opposite direction to each 
other. If the latter effect outweighs the former, the level of unemployment falls. This 
happens under the sufficient condition as mentioned in proposition 3.  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper has developed a three-sector general equilibrium model that can explain 
unemployment of both skilled and unskilled labour. The unemployment of unskilled 
labour is explicated in terms the of rural-urban migration mechanism while that of skilled 
labour is shown using the ‘fair wage hypothesis’. Apart from the two types of labour 
there are two types of capital in this model. Capital of type N is specific to the primary 
export sector (sector 1) while capital of type K is used in all the three sectors of the 
economy. Consequences of foreign capital inflows of both types have been studied on 
national welfare and unemployment of either type of labour. The paper finds that an 
inflow of foreign capital into the primary export sector unambiguously improves social 
welfare. On the contrary, although inflows of capital of type K unquestionably improve 
the aggregate factor income it may fail to improve social welfare. The unemployment 
situation of the skilled labour unequivocally improves in both the cases. Finally, while 
capital of type N definitely lowers the urban unemployment of the unskilled labour, the 
effect of an inflow of type K capital may fail to improve the situation unless the 
centripetal force of an increase in the rural sector wage is stronger than the centrifugal 
force resulting from an increase in the expected urban wage. The paper, therefore, 
justifies the desirability of FDI flow in the primary export sector from the perspective of 
both unemployment and social welfare. It is important to mention that after witnessing 
China’s exemplary success in the agricultural front the developing economies like India 
are of late toying with the idea of permitting foreign investment in agriculture.15 The 
                                                           
15 See Deshpande (2007) in this context.   
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analysis of the paper provides a theoretical foundation of such a move by the developing 
nations. 
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Appendix I: 
 
Solving (19) by Cramer’s rule the following result is obtained.  
*
1 4 3
ˆ
( )ˆ L
R B
DN

           (A.1) 
                   (+)(–) 
where:  
* 1 * 1
4 3 1 2 6 1 2 1 2 5 1 2( ) ( )L K K L NL N K K L NLD B B S B S                
                                    (+)                                    (+)  
                                                          *2 4 3 3 4   + [ ]L K J B B H       (20) 
                                                                                     (–) 
 
1 2 3 1 1 1{ ( ) ( )}L NJ B B       ; 
1 3 1 1( )L NH      ; and,        (A.2) 
*
1 2 2 1
*( ) 0L K L K
W
W
                                    
(Note that * 0  as sector 1 is more unskilled labour-intensive vis-à-vis sector 2 in value 
sense.) 
 
In an indecomposable production structure like this it is sensible to assume that R falls 
(rises) if N rises (falls) i.e.
ˆ
( ) 0.ˆ
R
N
 From (A.1) it then follows that 
0D              (22) 
From (20), (A.2) and (22) it follows that two sufficient conditions for 0D  are: 
, 0J H  . 
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Appendix II: 
 
As 1 3( ); ( ) 0
( ) ( )S S
E EE EW W
W R
   
 
and 11 33, 0E E  we must have 
2
1 11[ ( ) ] 0S
WE E
W
   ; and, 
2
3 33[ ( ) ] 0S
WE E
R
   . Using (18) one can write 
1 1( ) 0B   ; and,                          (A.3) 
3 2( ) 0B   . 
 
From Assumption A it follows that 
1 1
1 3
( ) ( )L
N
 
 
           (A.4) 
That 0H  is a direct consequence of Assumption A. We are going to prove that 0J  if 
Assumption B holds. 
 
From (23)  
0J   1 1 1
1 3 2
( ) ( )L
N
B
B
 
 


        (A.5) 
Now  
1 2 3 11 1 1 1 2 1
3 2 3 3 2 3 2 3 3 1
( )( )[ ] [ ] ( )[ ]
( ) ( )
B BB B B
B B B
   
      
   
  
 
Substituting the values of 1B and 2B from (18) and simplifying we can obtain the following 
expression. 
33 111 1 1 1
3 2 3 3 2 3 1
( )[ ] ( )[ ]
( )
S SE W E WB
B B E R E W
  
  
  
 
      (A.6) 
Now if 33 11
3 1
( ) ( )S SE W E W
E R E W
 i.e. if Assumption B holds from (A.3) and ( A.6) it follows that 
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1 1 1
3 2 3
( )
( )
B
B
 
 


         (A.7) 
From (A.4) and (A.7) we can write  
 1 1 1
1 3 2
( ) ( )L
N
B
B
 
 


0J  . 
Combining (A.4) and (A.7) and using (21) one can write 
1 1 1 1
1 3 3 2
( ) ( ) ( ) , 0.L
N
B J H
B
  
  
   

       (22) 
 
Appendix III: 
 
Solving (19) by Cramer’s rule, using (18), (22) and (23) and simplifying the following 
results can be obtained. 
 
*
4 1 3ˆ 0ˆ
N BW
DN
  
   ;   
*
4 1 3 2
ˆ
0ˆ
N LBW
DK
     ; 
*
1 4 3
ˆ
( ) 0ˆ L
R B
DN

   ;       
*
2 1 4 3
ˆ ( ) 0ˆ
L L BR
DK
     
*
4
ˆ
0ˆ
                     
SW J
DN

  ;      
*
2
4
ˆ
0ˆ
                     
S LW J
DK
    
*
3
ˆ 0ˆ
v B H
DN

  ;  
*
2
3
ˆ 0ˆ
Lv B H
DK
                                                                        (A.8) 
* 1 *1
2 4 3 3 4 2 4 3 1 1 1 1 2
ˆ 1 [ ( ) { ( ) } ] 0ˆ D L K K L LN N L N L
X J B B H B S
N
                 
 
1 *
3 2 41
1 1
ˆ
( ) 0ˆ
NL L
L N
B SX
DK
      ; 3 4 1 6 1 52
ˆ ( ) 0ˆ
L NB B BX
DK
      
1 *2
1 4 3 3 4 1 4 3 1 1 1 1 2
ˆ 1 [ ( ) { ( ) }] 0ˆ L K K L LN N L N L
X J B B H B S
DN
                    
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Results presented in (A.8) have been verbally stated in proposition 1.                 
 
Appendix IV: 
 
Totally differentiating (12), using (A.8), (18), (22) and (23) and simplifying the following 
two expressions can be derived 
* *
4 3
1 1 4 3
ˆ
( ) ( ) {(1 ) }ˆ
S
N L D
B W SYY WL RN v J vB H
D DN
  
         
                                                                     (+)               (+)    ( –)(+) 
              1 *2 2 1 3 4 4 3 1 4 3 1 1 1 1 2[ ( ) { ( ) }]L K K L LN N L N L
tP X B B H J B S
D
               (A.9) 
                    (+)         (–)  (+)           (+)            (–)                        (+)                                                        
and, 
*4 3
1 1 2
ˆ
( ) ( )ˆ N L D L
BYY WL RN
DK
     
*
2
4 3{(1 ) }S L
W S v J vB H
D
            
                   (–)                                           (+)                 (+)   ( –)(+)                                   
                                                                   4 3 2 2 1 6 1 5{( ) ( )}L N
B tP X B B
D
      (A.10) 
                                                                          (–)                      (+)   
 
Now 
1 1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) 0DN L D N L
N
NWL RN W L a
a
              (A.11) 
(as from (7) 1
1
D
N
N X
a
 ; and, DN N ) 
Using (A.11) from (A.9) we can conclude that  
ˆ
( ) 0ˆ
Y
N
 .  
However the sign of 
ˆ
( )ˆ
Y
K
is ambiguous which is clear from (A.10). 
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Appendix V: 
 
Total differentials of equation (28) yield 
* *
2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ[( ) ( ) ]LU U L
W W WL X W
W W
   
       (A.12)
 
where ( )ULU
L
L
   
Using (A.8) and simplifying from (A.12) the following expressions  can be derived. 
*
2
1 3 4 3 4
ˆ
( ) ( )[[( )[ ( )ˆ
U L
L K
LU
L W W B B H J
D WN
   

  1 *1 4 3 1 1 1 1 2{ ( ) }]K L LN L N N LB S        
    
                     (+)                          ( –)(+)(+)    (+)(+)       (+)( –)                        (+)                                      
 
                                                                            
*
*
1 4 3( )( ) ]] 0.N
W B
W
   
             (A.13)
 
                                                                                                (–)  (+) 
 
1 14 3 2
1 1 1 1 2
ˆ *( ) ( )[( ) ( ) ( ){ˆ
U L
L N L LN NL N L
LU
L B WS S
D WK
      

   
 
                                                                          
1 1
1 1 1( ) ( )}]L N L LN NLS S    
           (A.14) 
From (A.14) it follows that 
ˆ
( ) 0ˆ
UL
K
 if 1 11 1 1
1 2
)1 (( )( ))L N L LN NL
N L
S S  
 
                  (A.15) 
